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Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suitable regulation of large, systemically important financial 
institutions remains an elusive goal since the Financial Crisis of 2008.  
While the United States was quick to respond to the Crisis with the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act1 (“Dodd-Frank”), that legislation remains controversial.  
On the one hand, Congress has given serious consideration to new 
legislative proposals that would shorten Dodd-Frank’s reach.2  On the 
other hand, Democratic presidential candidates spar over whether 
Dodd-Frank is a good law in need of tweaking or is a weak law 
requiring significant overhaul.3 
In the midst of the continuing debate stands the regulation of 
banks’ capital.  Capital regulation—which constrains the amount of a 
bank’s debt in relation to its equity—has emerged as the centerpiece of 
modern regulation.  While significant debate exists over the appropriate 
levels of required capital, consensus opinion supports this form of 
regulation as an appropriate and necessary response to financial crises.  
More capital and less debt makes banks more resilient and better able 
to withstand inevitable economic crises.  Naturally, the devil is in the 
details, and the debate regarding capital regulation largely boils down to 
the question of how much capital is enough, or, on the flip side, how 
much debt is too much. 
Proponents of higher capital requirements claim that the regulation 
 
 *  Professor, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.  I am grateful to 
the Washburn Law Journal for its invitation to give the Fall 2015 Foulston Siefkin Lecture, on which 
this Article is based.  I thank the Washburn Law School faculty and students for their comments and 
Foulston Siefkin LLP for their support.  My thanks to Dan Awrey, Anna Gelpern, Julie Hill, Saule 
Omarova, Pat McCoy, and Art Wilmarth for comments and encouragement on earlier drafts. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 134 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., The Financial Regulatory Improvement Act of 2015, S. 1484, 114th Cong. (2015), 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/key-issues [https://perma.cc/Q5RE-5KUT] 
(proposing, among other things, the elimination of the automatic designation of certain bank holding 
companies as systemically important financial institutions). 
 3. Laura Meckler, Ryan Tracy & Andrew Ackerman, Clinton, Sanders Offer Contrasting 
Approaches to Wall Street Regulation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2016, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/sanders-clinton-offer-contrasting-approaches-to-wall-street-regulation-
1452887307 [https://perma.cc/68EB-4BQK]. 
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of capital solves most problems associated with banks’ operations and 
that it might even eliminate the need for other types of regulation.  
Opponents of higher capital requirements claim such regulations 
increase the costs of banks’ operations and therefore restrict the credit 
available to the overall economy.  Between these extreme views is the 
reality that determining the appropriate mix of debt and equity involves 
a significant amount of guesswork with regard to how much capital is 
necessary to make and keep banks safe.  Along with that guesswork 
comes a significant risk of error. 
Given the obvious benefits of capital, policy makers raised 
regulatory capital requirements so that banks are now required to fund 
more of their operations with equity than in the years prior to the Crisis.  
Yet, many believe that capital rules, in the form of minimum ratios 
applied to all banks, are still much too low—asserting that such required 
ratios will not provide the necessary solvency protection in the event of 
another major crisis.  A review of current regulatory practice shows that 
bank regulators also treat the current capital ratios as insufficient.  Bank 
regulators, utilizing their significant discretionary authority, regularly 
impose higher capital requirements on individual firms.4  This practice 
demonstrates the reality that current capital ratios are not just 
minimum, but bare minimum, ratios.  Agency rules set these bare 
minimum ratios, but agencies impose higher requirements through 
administrative enforcement powers and capital planning related stress 
testing.5  The result is a system of bottom-up regulation with the rules 
providing a thin foundation on which the supervisory process builds. 
Yet in this bottom-up system, the risk of error in determining 
appropriate levels of capital remains at the feet of regulators and, 
therefore, ultimately, the public.  If it turns out that a very large bank, in 
particular, is undercapitalized and fails, losses will be borne by the 
public via government subsidies and harm to the overall economy. 
The risks associated with determining sufficient capital could be 
more sensibly addressed by flipping the current practice from a bottom-
up to a top-down system of capital regulation.  In a top-down system, 
capital ratios applicable to all banks would be set high—high enough so 
that the risk of undercapitalization is very small.  The opposite risk, the 
risk associated with requiring excessive capital, would be addressed 
through a supervisory process, in which banks could be permitted, on a 
firm-by-firm basis, to operate below capital levels set by rule. 
The top-down system must go one step further to insulate the 
public from the risk of error.  Therefore, the top-down system relies on 
 
 4. See infra Part IV. 
 5. Id. 
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the well-established premise that bank managers are ultimately 
responsible for capital adequacy—appropriate, given their superior 
knowledge of their firms’ operations and risk management.  Thus, the 
top-down system would access that superior knowledge and provide 
incentives to avoid error by relying on bank managers to determine 
appropriate capital adequate levels. 
In this way, if a bank wished to operate at a ratio lower than 
required under applicable rules (which now serve as a safe harbor), the 
bank’s management could apply to regulators for an exemption from 
the rules.  Such an application would require management to assure 
bank regulators that the bank could operate safely at lower levels of 
capital.  To create appropriate incentives for a meaningful application 
(as opposed to a pro forma statement that lower capital is adequate), an 
application would serve as the basis for personal liability (including 
appropriate fines and other penalties) against managers if their 
assertions regarding capital adequacy proved wrong.  Thus, given the 
risk  of error, the top-down system provides for safer banks and 
appropriate loss allocation.  Bank managers would be responsible for 
error if they seek exemption from capital rules, but may also choose to 
enjoy safe harbor protections. 
In proposing a top-down system of capital regulation, this Article 
shares a precautionary attitude toward bank regulation found 
increasingly in post-Financial Crisis scholarship.  The viewpoint is one 
that  favors ex ante financial regulation6 in which regulators are charged 
with avoiding public harm.7  More broadly, this Article rejects the 
notion that regulation is the enemy of markets and therefore must be 
minimized.  Regulation is viewed neutrally—neither inherently good 
nor inherently bad—as a co-existing partner in highly complex and ever 
evolving financial markets.8 
 
 6. As discussed infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text, bank supervision, which includes 
extensive monitoring of individual firms, is a form of ex ante regulation in that the purpose of such 
monitoring is not just to identify violations of law but also to avoid them. 
 7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty,(Duke 
L.Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Ser. No. 2015-40, 2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2644375 [https://perma.cc/63DM-ZS38] 
(discussing the application of a precautionary principle to corporate decisionmaking in systemically 
important firms); Hilary Allen, A New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 173 (1973) (proposing the application of the precautionary approach to financial stability 
regulation); Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial 
Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63 (2012) [hereinafter Omarova, License to Deal] (proposing a 
system of ex ante licensing of complex financial instruments). 
 8. In the commenting on the post-Financial Crisis reaction to the pre-Financial Crisis blind 
belief in markets as the master of risk, Dan Awrey observes: “Just as market fundamentalism has 
been found wanting in the wake of the [Global Financial Crisis], so too will any approach to 
regulation which favors ideological purity over the rigorous and ongoing evaluation of the market 
frictions and market failures that attract regulatory scrutiny and the anticipated costs and benefits of 
various forms of regulatory intervention.”  Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation 
of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 240–41 (2012). 
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To develop the case for a top-down system of capital regulation, 
this Article continues as follows, Part II describes the normative 
foundations of bank regulation—setting the stage for the examination of 
the importance of capital regulation.  Part III overviews the distinctive 
elements of rulemaking and supervision in the bank regulatory regime.  
Part IV briefly maps the development of capital regulation and surveys 
the current rules and supervision.  Part V considers the limitations of 
capital regulation, which serve as the foundation for proposals for 
significantly higher capital.  Finally, Part VI sets forth a proposal in 
support of higher capital ratios through the top-down mechanism. 
II.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF BANK REGULATION 
Long before the terms “too-big-to-fail” (“TBTF”) or “systemically 
important” were ever coined, banks—large and small—were subjected 
to a system of prudential regulation (also known as “safety and 
soundness” regulation).9  Since the Financial Crisis, two forms of 
prudential regulation are often identified—micro-prudential regulation, 
and macro-prudential regulation.  Micro-prudential regulation seeks to 
avoid bank failure, while macro-prudential regulation seeks to limit 
risks associated with financial institutions more broadly.10  Although the 
two forms of prudential regulation overlap, this Article primarily 
focuses on micro-prudential, asking: how can regulation reduce the 
likelihood of individual bank failure?  Before entering into a discussion 
of any particular mechanism for preserving banks’ safety and soundness 
through micro-prudential regulation, it is appropriate to consider the 
normative basis for bank regulation.  The discussion below groups the 
normative basis for bank regulation into three (potentially overlapping) 
orientations: functional, market-based, and public interest.11 
A functional account for bank regulation is perhaps the most 
traditional.  According to this view, the prudential regulation of banks 
seeks to protect banks from failure because of their importance to the 
overall economy.  The so-called “specialness” of banks derives from the 
unique services they provide customers in the form of both payments 
and liquidity.12  While banks provide these essential services, they are 
 
 9. The first federal bank regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), 
was established in 1863.  History: 150 Years of the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/what-we-do/history/index-history.html 
[https://perma.cc/RS4F-XQF9]. 
 10. For discussion on the difference between micro and macro prudential regulation, see 
MARKUS K. BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION, 
xvi (2009). 
 11. Similarly, Professor Omarova identifies three forms of, overlapping, financial regulation: 
risk regulation, economic regulation, and social regulation.  Omarova, License to Deal, supra note 7, 
at 79. 
 12. For the classic exploration of banks’ special role in the economy, see E. Gerald Corrigan, 
SCHOONER CORRECT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2016  12:19 PM 
2016] Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation 331 
 
fragile as a result.  Banks hold, on the one hand, short-term liabilities 
(e.g., bank deposits) and, on the other hand, long-term assets (e.g., 
mortgage loans).  In doing so, banks suffer from maturities mismatch, 
meaning their liabilities are due in the short term but their assets are 
available only in the long term.  In addition, as will be discussed in detail 
below, banks utilize significant leverage which also serves as an 
important source of their fragility.  Therefore, these special institutions 
are also financially fragile and in need of regulation to protect them 
from insolvency. 
An economist’s view of the purpose of bank regulation naturally 
focuses on banks’ role in a market-based economy.  Much like coal-fired 
factories, the failure of a bank generates negative externalities or 
spillover effects.13  In other words, when banks fail—particularly the 
very large ones—it is not just the banks’ shareholders, creditors, and 
employees who suffer.  The wider economy suffers when banks fail 
because the loss of, for example, payment services causes households 
and businesses to suffer.  And the decrease in the availability of credit to 
the economy can cause or worsen an economic slowdown.  Therefore, 
an economist would explain that the regulation of banks is necessary to 
correct a market failure— the negative externality.14 
A growing number of commentators have moved away from both 
the functional description (with its emphasis on the uniqueness of 
services banks provide) and the economist’s explanation (which 
emphasizes the proper functioning of private markets).  Many 
commentators now favor a view of bank regulation that emphasizes the 
broad public interest.15  According to this view, bank regulation is not 
an extrinsic force applied to private firms, but is endogenous to special 
institutions that are created by governments to serve the public.  Much 
like utilities, banks operate not primarily to generate profit for their 
 
Annual Report 1982; Are Banks Special?, MINNEAPOLIS FED. RESERVE BANK (1982), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/annual-reports/ar/annual-report-1982-complete-text 
[https://perma.cc/YQ3M-SDFK].  Professors Carnell, Macey and Miller observe: 
The claim that banks are special thus has a curious dual aspect.  On the one hand, it justifies 
regulatory interventions uncommon or unknown in other businesses.  Few businesses face 
such pervasive governmental control.  In this respect we could view banks as specially 
disfavored because government regulation pervasively limits their freedom of action.  On 
the other hand, the claim to specialness also justifies regulator favors for banks.  Few other 
businesses can offer creditor the protection afforded by government deposit insurance.  
Few have ready access to a governmental lender of last resort.  Few have benefitted so 
handsomely from regulatory constraints on competition. 
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 57–58 (5th ed. 2013). 
 13. See generally Joseph Stiglitz, Regulation and Failure, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON 
REGULATION 11 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009). 
 14. See BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., supra note 10, at xvii (“We regulate in order to internalize 
these externalities”). 
 15. The public interest view of banking is not new.  See, e.g., Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 83 
(Kan. 1911) (“The public patronage which the banker invites and receives is of such a character that 
he becomes in a just sense a trustee of the fiscal affairs of the people and of the state.”). 
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shareholders, but rather to provide necessary services to the public.16  
This public interest view takes various shapes.  Broadly, banks are seen 
as a mechanism through which governments implement ongoing social 
policy.17  More narrowly, banks are seen as fundamentally private 
institutions which enjoy legal privileges (such as limited liability) and 
government subsidies (like deposit insurance).18  In exchange for such 
privileges, banks must be subjected to regulation to ensure that the 
banks’ operations are consistent with the public interest.19 
The normative perspective of bank regulation matters.20  The 
traditional functional view of bank regulation is sustainable only if 
banks provide unique services not otherwise available to businesses and 
households.21  The economist’s story of market failure tends to favor 
very limited regulation.  That is, regulation which only seeks to correct a 
measurable market failure, which must be justified under rigorous 
cost/benefit type analysis.22  The public interest justification can support 
a less tentative regulatory role because banks are treated as a 
 
 16. While he was Kansas City Federal Reserve President, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig labeled banks public utilities and suggested 
that they be regulated as such.  See Daniel Indiviglio, Should Big Banks Be Regulated as Utilities?, 
THE ATLANTIC April 14, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/04/should-big-
banks-be-regulated-as-utilities/237342/ [https://perma.cc/754E-MJX4].  Lord Adair Turner, chair of 
the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority, made waves when he questioned the “social 
usefulness” of investment banking activities.  Andrew Ward & Patrick Jenkins, Building Banks a 
Branch at a Time, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2cd4d06-1bf6-
11df-a5e1-00144feab49a.html#axzz3z3EbJER6 [https://perma.cc/A64R-ZKGR]; see also John 
Cassidy, What Good is Wall Street?, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 29, 2010, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/11/29/what-good-is-wall-street [https://perma.cc/2FMT-
976M].  Addressing systemically important financial institutions in particular, Professor Steven 
Schwarcz argues in favor of expanding managers’ private corporate governance duty to investors to 
also include a public corporate governance duty to society.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections: 
The Public Governance Duty, 50 GA. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections]. 
 17. Hocket and Omarova describe a developmental finance state in which the government 
participates actively in financial markets.  See generally, Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, 
Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 
(2015).  Recognizing the “social contract” between banks and governments, Mehrsa Baradaran 
proposes a federally owned bank to serve the needs of lower income individuals.  MEHRSA 
BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THREAT TO 
DEMOCRACY  (2015).  Allen, supra note 7, at 177. 
 18. A group of twenty prominent academics argue that regulation should strive to create 
healthy banks that provide useful services rather than maximum returns for shareholders and 
managers.  Anat Admati et al., Heathy Banking System is the Goal, not Profitable Banks, THE 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 9. 2010. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Richard J. Parsons, Warring Ideologies Dash Small Banks’ Hope for Reg Relief, 
AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 25, 2015, http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/warring-ideologies-
dash-small-banks-hopes-for-reg-relief-1076927-1.html [https://perma.cc/A94F-M8ZV] (discussing the 
impact of differing ideology on bank regulation). 
 21. The growth of alternative, non-bank payment system providers could, for example, 
undermine this justification.  See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment Intermediaries, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 681, 683–90 (2004) (discussing the development of unregulated payment systems). 
 22. See Allen, supra note 7, at 177 (“Unfortunately, because of the difficulties inherent in 
providing hard empirical evidence of the benefits of financial stability rules, such rules . . . are 
unlikely to be able to withstand the application of a strict cost-benefit analysis standard of review, 
and are thus likely to be invalidated if challenged.”) 
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government instrumentality inherently subject to significant democratic 
control. 
III.  BANK REGULATION: RULEMAKING AND SUPERVISION 
Given the many ways to justify the regulation of banks, it should 
come as no surprise that banks are subject to extensive regulation.23  
Here, the term “regulation” is used in its broadest sense to include all 
forms of agency control over regulated entities.  This includes: (1) 
agency rulemaking, an administrative process that involves writing 
proscriptive rules that apply to all regulated entities, and (2) agency 
supervision, the administrative processes that involve application of 
rules to specific firms through bank examination and enforcement.24  
Below is an overview of the regulation of banks, beginning with a 
summary of rules that apply to all banks (or large categories of banks) 
and then a discussion of the process of firm-specific examination and 
enforcement. 
Prudential rules traditionally have sought to protect banks from 
failure primarily by limiting entry into the banking business and by 
restricting banks’ activities.  Thus, significant barriers surround the 
business of banking in the form of licensing and other entry restrictions.  
Banks are subject to a special chartering process which is extensive and 
substantive and, therefore, very distinct from the essentially pro forma 
process for incorporating other business entities.25  Bank organizers 
must meet fitness standards26 and must demonstrate knowledge of the 
principles of safety and soundness.27  Perhaps more importantly, once a 
bank receives a charter, its activities are restricted.  Banks are 
prohibited from engaging in commercial (i.e. non-financial) activities.28  
And, even within the financial sphere, banks’ activities are limited.29  
 
 23. Several agencies are responsible for bank regulation at the federal level.  The FDIC is the 
primary federal regulator for state-chartered, commercial banks that are not members of the Federal 
Reserve System (“Federal Reserve”).  12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(2) (2012).  The OCC is the primary 
federal regulator for nationally-chartered commercial banks and savings institutions.  Id. 
§ 1813(q)(1).  The Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve is the primary regulator for bank 
holding companies and state-chartered, commercial banks that are members of the Federal Reserve, 
as well as certain non-bank financial companies.  Id. §§ 1813(q)(3), 5323(a). 
 24. For a full discussion of the examination and enforcement process, see RICHARD SCOTT 
CARNELL ET AL, supra note 12, at 431–83. 
 25. For an extensive discussion of the chartering process for banks, see Robert C. Hockett & 
Saule T. Omarova, “Special,” Vestigial, or Visionary?: What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the 
Corporation – and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 474–83 (2016). 
 26. For example, the organizers of a federally chartered bank (called “national” banks) must 
demonstrate that they “have the experience, competence, willingness, and ability to be active in 
directing the proposed national bank’s affairs in a safe and sound manner.”  Organizing a National 
Bank or Federal Savings Association, 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(g)(1) (2015). 
 27. 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(h)(6). 
 28. National banks may engage only in activities related to the “business of banking” as set 
forth in the National Bank Act.  National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2014). 
 29. Bank holding companies (essentially, a bank’s parent company) are restricted to activities 
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For example, the Glass-Steagall Act30 famously separated commercial 
banking from investment banking, and vice versa.31  More recently, 
Congress enacted the Volcker Rule,32 a provision within Dodd-Frank, 
which prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading, 
and limits their relationships with hedge funds and private equity 
funds.33  Banks’ permitted activities are heavily regulated as well.  For 
example, banks are limited in the size of loans they can make to one 
borrower.34  A bank may lend to its officers and directors only in 
accordance with specific rules.35  Banks’ ability to transact with its 
affiliates is also regulated.36 
In addition to the regulation of banks’ activities, the overall mix of 
banks’ assets and liabilities is also a frequent target of regulation.  As 
discussed in Part IV, capital regulation has emerged as a centerpiece of 
modern bank regulation.  Capital regulation limits the extent to which a 
bank can fund its activities with debt.  The overall purpose of capital 
regulation is to limit the risk of insolvency associated with banks that 
carry too much debt.  Regulations focused on a bank’s sources of funds 
take the form of various ratios that impose limits on the bank’s debt. 
In addition, banks are often vulnerable to insolvency when they 
lack sufficient liquid assets to meet their current obligations.  Banks are 
particularly vulnerable to this liquidity type of insolvency because many 
of their liabilities have short-term maturities (e.g., deposits, repurchase 
 
that are “so closely related to banking.”  12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).  The activities of “financial holding 
companies” (well managed; well capitalized bank holding companies) are limited to those activities 
that are “financial in nature.” 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1). 
 30. Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
 31. The provisions of Glass-Steagall which prohibited banks from affiliating with securities 
firms were repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLB”).  Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections in 12 & 15 U.S.C.).  GLB did not, however, repeal § 16 of Glass-Steagall which prohibits 
national banks from engaging in most underwriting.  12 U.S.C. § 24.  GLB also did not repeal § 21 of 
Glass-Steagall which prohibits securities firms from taking deposits.  12 U.S.C § 378. 
 32. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851). 
 33. 12 U.S.C. 1851(a)(1).  The purpose of the Volcker Rule, among other things, is to restrict 
banks from engaging in highly profitable and yet highly risky activities while at the same time 
enjoying access to the federal safety net.  A Senate Report found: “The prohibitions in section 619 
therefore will reduce potential taxpayer losses at institutions protected by the federal safety net, and 
reduce threats to financial stability, by lowering their exposure to risk.”  S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 8 
(2010).  For a complete discussion of the Volcker covered funds rule, see Erik F. Gerding, Volcker’s 
Covered Funds Rule & Trans-Statutory Cross Referenced: Securities Regulation in the Service of 
Banking Law, 10 CAP. MARK. L.J. 4, 488 (August 2015).  For a discussion of the Volcker proprietary 
trading rule, see Onnig H. Dombalagian, The Expressive Synergies of the Volcker Rule, 54 B.C. L. 
REV. 469 (2013). 
 34. 12 U.S.C. § 84; 12 C.F.R. § 32.1 (2015).  For a general discussion of rules restricting loans to 
one borrower, see HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL BANK 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 185–93 (2010). 
 35. 12 U.S.C. § 375b; 12 C.F.R. §§ 215.1–215.12. 
 36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1.  For a comprehensive discussion of affiliation rules, see Saule T. 
Omavora, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the 
Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011). 
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agreements) and many of their assets have long-term maturities (e.g., 
mortgage loans).  Liquidity has been traditionally regulated through 
mandatory reserve requirements—rules that require banks to hold a 
certain percentage of their deposit liabilities (e.g., a rule that allows a 
bank to lend out only $90 of every $100 deposit).37  More recently, bank 
regulators have imposed additional liquidity requirements on large and 
internationally active banks through a mandatory liquidity coverage 
ratio that compares a bank’s high quality liquid assets to its expected 
cash demands over a thirty day period.38 
In addition to the extensive rules governing banks’ operations, 
banks are subject to an intensive examination and enforcement regime 
(collectively referred to as “supervision”).  Supervision is distinct from 
regulation in that its focus is on individual institutions as opposed to 
writing rules that apply to all banks (or large categories of banks).  The 
foundation of bank supervision is the process of both on-site and off-site 
monitoring.  Bank regulators monitor a bank’s operations through 
periodic reports and on-site examinations.  Generally, bank regulators 
are required to conduct an annual on-site examination.39 
The process of monitoring can lead to a determination that a bank 
has violated a rule.  Under such circumstances, bank regulators have 
broad power to bring administrative enforcement actions against banks 
and bank managers40 for violating a law or rule, or, more broadly, 
engaging in an unsafe and unsound banking practice.41  The 
administrative enforcement powers include: cease and desist powers 
(which can include the authority to order restitution, reimbursement or 
indemnification),42 removal from office and prohibition from 
participation in the banking industry,43 and civil money penalties.44  As 
discussed in Part IV, capital requirements often serve as the basis for 
administrative enforcement actions. 
 
 37. 12 U.S.C. § 461.  The Federal Reserve Board sets reserve requirements in its Regulation D, 
12 C.F.R. § 204.1–204.10. 
 38. 12 C.F.R. § 249. 
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d). 
 40. Bank officers, directors, employees, and certain shareholders, as well as certain 
professionals (under some circumstances) are “institution-affiliated parties” under federal banking 
statutes and, therefore, potentially subject to enforcement actions.  Id. § 1813(u). 
 41. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.  For a full discussion of the meaning of “unsafe 
and unsound banking practices,” see Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties’ Demanding 
Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
175 (1995).  These agencies’ determinations may be appealed to the appropriate United States Court 
of Appeals.  12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). 
 42. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1).  Banking agencies have the authority to issue a cease and desist 
order against a bank and/or its managers for engaging in “an unsafe or unsound practice” or violating 
“a law, rule, or regulation, or any condition imposed in any application, notice . . . or any written 
agreement entered into with the agency.”  Id. 
 43. Id. § 1818(e)(1). 
 44. Id. § 1818(i)(2). 
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IV.  CAPITAL ADEQUACY: THE CORNERSTONE OF BANK REGULATION 
As discussed in Part III, banks are subjected to many forms of 
regulation.  The regulation of capital, however, has emerged as the 
cornerstone of modern bank regulation.  Most discussions of capital 
regulation focus on the agencies’ rules, which set minimum capital 
requirements through various financial ratios and, therefore, such 
discussions can quickly devolve into a technocratic morass.  In an 
attempt to illuminate rather than obfuscate, this Part begins with a stark 
overview of capital regulation using a typical household, as opposed to 
using a bank, as the running example. 
With that broad view in mind, this Part moves on to highlight bank 
management’s role in capital adequacy and then to discuss the minimum 
ratios which form the foundation for capital regulation.  Next, this Part 
discusses the often ignored supervisory process of examination and 
enforcement and the important role it plays in capital regulation.  
Finally, this Part concludes with the formulation of an overall picture of 
how capital regulation functions through the combination of both rules 
and supervision—labeling the system “bottom-up capital regulation.” 
A.  Captial Regulation: The Big Picture 
Capital regulation limits the extent to which a bank can fund its 
activities with debt.  The capital regulatory regime has become 
increasingly complex in the last thirty years.  Before diving into 
examination of this complex regime, let us consider the fundamental 
principles of capital regulation through the application of the same 
principles to an individual household. 
Consider Sam, a consumer who wants to purchase a home for 
$500,000.  Sam may enjoy access to various sources to supply the 
purchase price for the home, such as: mortgage loans, loans from family 
members, savings, gifts, and other liquid investments.  Suppose Sam 
wishes to finance the entire $500,000 purchase with borrowed money.  
Funding the purchase of the home entirely with debt raises a number of 
issues.  Most importantly, Sam’s bank will not typically be willing to 
lend Sam the entire purchase price.  Instead, the bank may require Sam 
to come up with a “down payment” based on a percentage of the 
purchase price.  That required down payment operates as a form of 
capital regulation. 
In this case, Sam’s bank (as opposed to bank regulators as 
discussed below), is requiring Sam to finance the acquisition of the 
home with some “equity”—non-borrowed funds.  Why might the bank 
insist on a down payment?  First, if Sam finances the purchase entirely 
with borrowed money, then Sam may be more likely to walk away from 
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the loan obligation if Sam, at some future date, has difficulty making the 
monthly payments.  Sam might be willing to simply walk away because 
Sam has no “stake” (i.e., equity) in the home.  If Sam defaults on the 
mortgage loan, the bank will foreclose on the home and there will be 
nothing left over for Sam from the sale of the house once the bank’s 
debt is paid.45  Second, suppose the value of the house declines.  
Nothing much will happen if Sam continues to make the required 
monthly loan payments.  But, if Sam can no longer make those 
payments, then the value of the home no longer matches the value of 
the outstanding debt (often referred to as an “underwater mortgage”).46  
This means that unless Sam has additional assets to make up the 
difference, Sam is rendered insolvent. 
A required down payment provides Sam and the lender with a 
cushion against Sam’s insolvency.  Had the lender required Sam to 
make a down payment of, for example, 5% (in this case, $25,000), then a 
decline in the value of the house would not create the financial 
instability described above.  Sam would be less likely to simply walk 
away from the mortgage loan (allowing the bank to foreclose) because 
that would mean giving up Sam’s equity.  Additionally, Sam would not 
face insolvency in the event that the house declined in value.  That is, of 
course, unless the value of the home declined by more than 5%.47 
B.  Capital Regulation: Who is Responsible 
Continuing with the example of Sam, it is important to recognize 
that even if Sam’s bank allows Sam to purchase a house with a very low 
down payment, Sam will be liable if Sam ends up unable to pay the 
mortgage payments when they come due.  Sam’s bank may be 
“regulating” Sam’s ability to fund the home purchase with too much 
debt, but Sam is ultimately responsible for those debts.  The regulation 
of banks’ capital operates in the same way.  While the remainder of this 
 
 45. Of course, this would not be true if the value of the house had appreciated.  So, if the 
consumer borrowed $500,000 to purchase a home with a $500,000 purchase price, and now the house 
is worth $550,000, then the consumer would not likely be indifferent to the $50,000 gain in equity.  
Still, stories about capital regulation are not as important under circumstances in which asset prices 
are rising.  In such cases, if our consumer was having difficulty paying the mortgage payments, the 
consumer could simply sell the house, pay off the mortgage balance, and pocket the equity.  Capital 
regulation is salient when assets prices are falling. 
 46. Following the Financial Crisis, ten million mortgaged properties were underwater, 
representing approximately one-fifth of all mortgaged properties.  JENNIFER TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S 
HOUSES:  HOW DECADES OF BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME 
MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 282 (2014). 
 47. Note that from the peak in 2006, U.S. housing prices fell by 28%.  FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE 
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 215 (2011).  Thus, the 5% down payment 
in this hypothetical would not have done much to save many homeowners from the adverse effects of 
falling home prices. 
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Part will focus on the role of banking agencies in regulating capital, the 
responsibility for maintaining adequate bank capital rests with bank 
management. 
Bank management’s responsibility for capital adequacy derives not 
only from their statutory obligations, but also from corporate 
governance policies.48  Sound corporate governance practices emphasize 
the role of managers in ensuring adequate capital.  The Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City highlights this point in its publication “Basics for 
Bank Directors”: 
As a bank director, you are responsible for making sure your bank’s 
capital is adequate for safe and sound operation.  Fulfilling this 
responsibility entails evaluating and monitoring your bank’s capital 
position and planning for its capital needs.49 
Bank managers’ independent responsibility to ensure adequate 
levels of capital may explain why banks do not always operate close to 
the regulatory minimum and, at times, hold much more capital than 
required by regulators.50 
C.  Capital Regulation: Rulemaking 
In the absence of government support, banks would face the same 
obstacles and risks that Sam faced when Sam wished to finance an asset 
purchase primarily with debt.  The existence of government support sets 
banks apart from other borrowers.  While all firms borrow money to 
fund investments (as opposed to funding those investments with capital 
contributions from shareholders or retained earnings), financial 
institutions rely much more heavily on debt than other non-financial 
firms.51  Banks are more highly leveraged (i.e., borrow more money) 
than other firms because they can borrow money at lower rates than 
other firms.52  Banks’ ability to borrow at low rates derives from the 
 
 48. As discussed in Part III, bank officers and directors can be held liable for violations of 
statute, regulation or for engaging in unsafe or unsound banking practices. 
 49. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, BASICS FOR BANK DIRECTORS 24 (5th ed. 
2010). 
 50. See ALLEN BERGER ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, RWP 08-01, HOW DO LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE 
THEIR CAPITAL RATIOS? (Apr. 2008) (finding that large banking organizations during the period of 
1992 to 2006 held significantly more equity capital than required by regulators). 
 51. According to a New York Federal Reserve Bank staff report: “a typical non-financial firm 
has equity that exceeds 50% of its assets.  By contrast, in mid 2010, the median capital ratio of 
commercial banks was about 8.5%.”  VIRAL ACHARYA ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW 
YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 490, ROBUST CAPITAL REGULATION, 2 (Apr. 2011). 
 52. See Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions, 37 J. OF BANKING & FIN., 3830, 3830–42 (2013); 
Andreas A. Jobst & Dale F. Gray, Systemic Contingent Claims Analysis—Estimating Market-
Implied Systemic Risk, (Washington: International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 13/54, 2013); 
Stefan Jacewitz & Jonathan Pgach Deposit Rate Advantages at the Largest Banks, (Washington: 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC Working Paper No. 2014-02, 2014).  If post Financial 
Crisis reforms prove successful, however, banks’ funding advantage may decline.  See Eric Platt & 
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government’s explicit (e.g., deposit insurance) or implicit (e.g., bailouts) 
guarantees of their solvency.53  Banks’ high leverage makes government 
bailouts necessary to avoid widespread economic fallout.  And, most 
infuriatingly, because banks enjoy government support, they can use 
cheap borrowed funds to grow their balance sheets even larger, which in 
turn, makes government support in a crisis all the more inevitable.  In 
other words, the TBTF problem feeds on itself.54  For all of these 
reasons, various rules (primarily found in agency regulations as opposed 
to statutes) limit the extent to which banks can fund their activities with 
debt.  The simplest of these, and the focus of this Article, is the leverage 
ratio.  The leverage ratio (sometimes referred to as the “simple leverage 
ratio”) is calculated by dividing a bank’s equity55 by its assets.56  The 
lower the ratio of equity to assets, the higher the bank’s leverage 
because, like in the example involving Sam, the bank has made a lower 
down payment on its asset investments.  U.S. banks have long been 
required under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) 
regulations to maintain a ratio of capital (equity) to total assets of 4%.57  
More recently, bank holding companies58 have also been required to 
comply with a leverage ratio of 4%.59  Again, like in the case of Sam, 
this is equivalent to requiring a bank to make a 4% down payment on 
the purchase of all of its assets. 
The simplicity of the leverage ratio proved attractive in reform 
efforts following the Financial Crisis.  The international standard setting 
body, the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision60 (“Basel Committee”) 
 
Ben McLannahan, S&P Downgrades Raft of US Banks, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2015, (credit rating 
agency’s downgrade of the eight largest U.S. bank holding companies is seen as evidence of decline in 
government support). 
 53. Acharya et al., supra note 51, at 8.  Banks’ preferences for debt represents a deviation from 
the Modigliani and Miller model.  For further discussion on this point, see SCHOONER & TAYLOR, 
supra note 34, at 133–34. 
 54. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MOVING FROM 
LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 103 (April 2014) (“Thus, countries emerged from the 
financial crisis with an even bigger problem:  many banks were even larger than before and so were 
the implicit government guarantees.”). 
 55. The amount of “equity” is really an accounting fiction which is derived by subtracting total 
liabilities from total assets. 
 56. Specifically, the leverage ratio is derived by dividing Tier 1 capital by total assets.  12 C.F.R. 
§ 325.3(b)(1) (2015).  Tier 1 capital is essentially made up of common and certain noncumulative 
preferred stock with various adjustments.  Id. § 325.2. 
 57. 12 C.F.R. § 325.3(b)(2).  Certain highly rated institutions are held to a 3% leverage ratio.  
Id. § 325.3(b)(1).  But that rule must be balanced against prompt corrective action rules (triggering 
certain agency action as bank capital deteriorates), which require an adequately capitalized bank to 
have a 4% or greater leverage ratio.  Id. § 325.103(b)(2)(iii). 
 58. A bank holding company is any company which has control over a bank.  12 U.S.C. 
§ 1841(a)(1). 
 59. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(a)(4) provides that a leverage ratio of 4% applies to a “board-regulated 
institution.”  12 C.F.R. § 217.2 defines a “board-regulated institution” to include, among other 
institutions, a bank holding company. 
 60. The Basel Committee was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the G-10 
countries.  For information on the Basel Committee, see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
ABOUT THE BASEL COMMITTEE, (Sept. 30, 2015), 
SCHOONER CORRECT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2016  12:19 PM 
340 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 55 
 
added a supplementary leverage ratio61 to its Basel III reforms.62  More 
demanding than the leverage ratios described above, a supplementary 
leverage ratio incorporates both on- and off-balance sheet assets and 
requires the ratio of capital to such assets of 3%.63 
Consistent with the Basel III reforms, the United States has 
incorporated supplemental leverage ratios since the Financial Crisis.  
Bank holding companies with assets equal to or greater than $250 billion 
or on-balance sheet foreign exposures equal to $10 billion must comply 
with a supplementary leverage ratio of 3%.64  Consistent with Basel III, 
the supplementary leverage ratio includes on-balance sheet and many 
off-balance sheet exposures in the calculation of assets.65  In addition, 
going beyond the standards set under Basel III, beginning on January 1, 
2018, bank holding companies with assets greater than $700 billion66 
must maintain an enhanced supplementary leverage ratio of 5% to 
avoid restrictions on dividends and discretionary bonus payments.67  
Note that more capital is required to meet the supplemental leverage 
ratio than the simple (generally-applicable) leverage ratio.68  As the 
notice of final rulemaking explains: “a 5 percent supplementary leverage 
ratio corresponds to roughly a 7.2 percent generally applicable leverage 
ratio and a 6 percent supplementary leverage ratio corresponds to 
roughly an 8.6 percent generally applicable leverage ratio.”69 
 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm?m=3%7C14%7C573 [https://perma.cc/49E3-BR3B]. 
 61. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III LEVERAGE RATIO 
FRAMEWORK AND DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, (January 2014) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9A6-G2XQ]. 
 62. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.htm [https://perma.cc/XA2Z-BVD7]. 
 63. The addition of off balance sheet assets makes this ratio harder to comply with since assets 
are in the denominator of the ratio and, thus, more capital is required in the numerator to meet the 
percentage minimum requirement. 
 64. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(a)(5) (supplementary leverage ratio of 3% applies to “advanced 
approaches Board-regulated institutions,” which is defined in 12 C.F.R. § 217.100(b) through 12 
C.F.R. § 217.2). 
 65. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(c)(4). 
 66. This captures the eight U.S. bank holding companies considered to be “global systemically 
important banks.”  Specifically, it includes:  Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells Fargo.  Global Capital 
Index: Capitalization Ratios for Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs), FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. (Mar. 30, 2015) https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/board/hoenig/capitalizationratios4q14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49P9-3QHP]. 
 67. 12 C.F.R. § 217.11(c).  In addition, the FDIC-insured bank subsidiaries of such large 
institutions must maintain a supplementary leverage ratio of 6% to be considered well capitalized 
under prompt corrective action rules. 12 C.F.R. § 324.403. 
 68. The Federal Reserve explained as follows: “Because total leverage exposure includes off-
balance sheet exposures, for any given company with material off-balance sheet exposures, the 
minimum amount of capital required to meet the supplementary leverage ratio would substantially 
exceed the amount of capital that would be required to meet the generally applicable leverage ratio, 
assuming that both ratios were set at the same level.”  Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, 
Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and Their 
Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 24528, 24530 (May 1, 2014). 
 69. Id. 
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While the leverage ratio has enjoyed a resurgence in recent years, 
other capital ratios were all the rage prior to the Financial Crisis and 
continue to be an essential part of the regulatory regime.  In fact, prior 
to the Financial Crisis, other capital ratios developed in direct reaction 
to the limitations of the leverage ratio.  The problem with the leverage 
ratio is that it does not account for the relative riskiness of banks’ assets.  
If a leverage ratio were applied in the opening example above, Sam 
would be required to make the same percentage down payment on any 
asset purchase, regardless of whether the  purchase is the $500,000 home 
or a painting to hang over the sofa in that home.  By treating all assets 
the same, the leverage ratio can encourage banks to hold relatively 
more risky assets (because riskier assets have a higher rate of return), 
which increases the bank’s risk of insolvency.  This limitation of the 
leverage ratio was the basis for the Basel Committee’s original capital 
accord, which came to be known as Basel I,70 in which it endorsed a 
risk-weighted capital requirement. 
Thinking back to the household example, a risk-weighted capital 
requirement requires different down payments for different assets: the 
riskier the asset, the higher the down payment.  Thus, Sam might be 
required to come up with a 20% down payment in purchasing a house 
(because real estate fluctuates in value) but could purchase a savings 
bond (a low risk asset) with no down payment at all, meaning Sam could 
make this purchase with all borrowed money. 
Under Basel I, capital is compared to risk-weighted assets (this 
ratio is generally referred to as the “capital ratio”), and must be greater 
than or equal to 8%.  With respect to the denominator of the capital 
ratio, Basel I has four risk-weighted buckets corresponding to certain 
classes of assets (or, four different down payments).  For example, 
under Basel I, certain loans carry a 20% risk-weight, which means that a 
bank must make such a loan with only 80% borrowed funds.71  With 
respect to the numerator of the capital ratio, capital has two 
components: core capital and supplementary capital.72  Core capital 
 
 70. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (July, 1988), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AUL-5CNC]. 
 71. On the other hand, cash assets carry a zero risk weight which, in effect, allows a bank to set 
aside no capital against its cash assets.  Basel I relies on membership in the Organization for 
Economic Development and Cooperation (“OECD”) to determine certain risk weights.  For 
example, a loan to an OECD bank with a maturity of greater than a year carries a 20% risk weight, 
whereas the same loan to a non-OECD bank country carries a 100% risk weight.  Residential 
mortgages are weighted under Basel 1 at 50%.  For further discussion of Basel I capital ratios, see 
SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 137–43. 
 72. In effect, the definition of capital is really about the defining a bank’s liabilities.  This is 
because capital is calculated by subtracting total assets from total liabilities.  In determining what 
constitutes total liabilities, a judgment as to the nature of contractual instruments must be made: is 
the instrument fundamentally an equity claim entitled to only residual assets or does the instrument 
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(Tier 1) comprises, primarily, paid-up capital and reserves.  
Supplementary capital (Tier 2) includes, among other things, various 
forms of subordinated debt and hybrid debt-equity instruments.  Thus, 
the capital ratio not only adjusts assets for their risk (the denominator), 
but also allows certain types of debt to count as capital (the numerator). 
While the Basel I capital ratio was adopted around the world, 
including in the United States, its limitations were soon apparent.  
Among other things, the four risk-weight buckets were crude 
measurements of asset risk.  Also, many off-balance sheet exposures 
were not reflected in the ratio.  These and other criticisms of Basel I led 
to Basel II, completed in 2004,73 which attempted further refinement of 
the risk-weighting categories and introduced the use of risk 
management tools for regulatory purposes.74  Basel II retained the same 
approach to the definition of capital in the numerator as originally 
established under Basel I.  Regarding the denominator, Basel II 
replaced the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development category approach with risk-weighted categories based on 
external credit ratings, often referred to as the standardized approach.  
In a more radical departure from Basel I, Basel II also adopted an 
alternative internal-ratings based approach which relies on banks’ 
internal estimates of the key risk elements that determine their required 
capital. 
Basel II was controversial75 and was never fully implemented in the 
United States before the Financial Crisis.  The Basel Committee 
responded to the Crisis with various new standards, including the 
supplemental leverage ratio discussed above.76  Also, the Basel 
Committee proposed revisions to the risk-weighted capital ratio.  Basel 
III places a strong emphasis on the sources of capital and raised the 
minimum capital requirement significantly.  While the ratio of capital to 
 
represent a contractual payment claim. 
 73. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (June, 2004), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf [https://perma.cc/V495-E4UV]. 
 74. For further discussion of Basel II, see SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 148–82. 
 75. The Quantitative Impact Studies conducted by the Basel Committee shows that large 
internationally active banks would have lower capital requirements under Basel II than under Basel 
I.  BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY 3 – OVERVIEW OF 
GLOBAL RESULTS (May 5, 2003), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/qis/qis3results.pdf [https://perma.cc/KR8E-
UGR6] (the study showed some increases in capital requirements for banks using the standardized 
approach). 
 76. One of the most immediate responses to the Financial Crisis was Basel II.5.  Basel II.5 was 
designed to discourage exploitation of the designation of bank assets into the banking book versus 
the trading book.  See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II 
MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (July, 2009), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs158.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WN8C-UVX7]; BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GUIDELINES FOR 
COMPUTING CAPITAL FOR INCREMENTAL RISK IN THE TRADING BOOK (July, 2009), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs159.pdf. [https://perma.cc/JE9L-4FDH]. 
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risk-weighted assets remains—as it has been since Basel I—at 8%, the 
composition of capital (the numerator) requires much more high quality 
capital and core capital.77  Basel III includes additional capital 
requirements in the form of conservation78 and countercyclical buffers.79  
While a point by point comparison of Basel III and the United States’ 
implementation thereof is beyond the scope of this Article, the United 
States has implemented most of Basel III.80  Most important to this 
Article, recall that, with regard to the supplemental leverage ratio, the 
U.S. standard exceeds that set under Basel III.81 
While the risk-weighted capital ratio remains an important element 
of capital regulation82 both at the international level, as reflected in 
Basel III, and in U.S. rules, the leverage ratio and supplementary 
leverage ratios have attracted special attention.  While all leverage 
ratios suffer from the fact that assets remain undifferentiated, this fact 
remains fundamental to the leverage ratios’ strength.  The counterpoint 
to the leverage ratio—the risk-based capital ratio—suffers under its own 
weight.  The attempt to quantify the risk of assets becomes, virtually, an 
 
 77. Basel II set common equity (the highest quality capital) to risk-weighted assets at 2% and 
Basel III increases that ratio to 4.5%.  Basel II set Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets at 4% and 
Basel III increases that ratio to 6%.  Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager, Bank for 
International Settlements, The Basel III Capital Framework: a Decisive Breakthrough (Nov. 22, 
2010) at 9, http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101125a.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WJG-FJZS]. 
 78. The conservation buffer requires an additional 2.5% of common equity Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets to be built up during good times and available to draw down during times of 
stress.  BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 54–57 (Dec. 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/87F5-F2UN]. 
 79. The countercyclical buffer requires an additional 1% to 2.5% of common equity Tier 1 or 
other loss absorbing capital to risk-weighted assets during times of excess aggregate credit growth.  
Id. at 57–60.  For a full discussion of countercyclical buffers, see Brett H. McDonnell, Designing 
Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18 N. C. BANKING INST. 123 (2013).Id. 
 80. Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital 
Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-
weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-
Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (October 11, 2013).  The 
Basel Committee has determined that the U.S. implementation of Basel III is largely consistent, 
stating: 
Overall, and given the planned adoption and implementation of some amendments 
described in this report that the US regulatory agencies agreed to take and proposed 
publically, the assessment team finds the risk-based capital requirements in the US to be 
largely compliant with the minimum standards agreed under the Basel framework. 
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME (RCAP) ASSESSMENT OF BASEL III REGULATIONS – UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 
(Dec., 2014), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d301.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YB6-KBUW]. 
 81. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
 82. “RWAs are an important part of both the micro- and macro-prudential toolkit, and can (i) 
provide a common measure for a bank’s risks; (ii) ensure that capital allocated to assets is 
commensurate with the risks; and (iii) potentially highlight where destabilizing asset class bubbles are 
arising.”  Vanessa Le Leslé & Sofiya Avramova, Revisiting Risk-weighted Assets 5 (Int’l Monetary 
Fund Working Paper No. 12/90, 2012).  Even very recently, the Basel Committee continues to issue 
standards regarding the risk weighting of assets.  See e.g., BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, STANDARDS: MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MARKET RISK (January, 
2016) http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d352.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5T7-EVTF] (discussing capital 
requirements for trading book assets). 
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impossible exercise.  Vice Chairman of the FDIC Thomas Hoenig 
observes: 
If risk weights could be assigned that anticipate and calibrate risks with 
perfect foresight, adjusted on a daily basis, then perhaps risk-weighted 
capital standards would be the preferred method for determining how to 
deploy capital.  However, they cannot.  To believe they can is a fallacy 
that puts the entire economic system at risk.83 
The observation of Hoenig and others,84 along with the observation 
that the FDIC’s leverage ratio helped insulate U.S. banks during the 
Financial Crisis over their European counterparts, led to the resurgence 
of the leverage ratio.  Of course, significant guesswork is endemic in the 
calculation of all capital ratios.  Risk-weighting assets (as Hoenig 
describes above), calculating core capital and determining the size of on- 
and off-balance sheet assets, all rely on estimation. 
D.  Capital Regulation: Supervision 
Note that the ratios described above are often referred to as 
“minimum” ratios.  Institutions that comply with the various ratios are 
not necessarily safe or unlikely to fail in a crisis.  In fact, experience 
suggests that minimum capital ratios are a lagging indicator of a bank’s 
financial stability such that declines in capital ratios are typically not 
evident until the institution is well on its way to insolvency.85  Thus, the 
firm-specific supervisory process is meant to correct the deficiencies of 
the one-size-fits all rule-based regulation.  The Federal Reserve Board’s 
capital rules explain: 
Notwithstanding the minimum requirements in this part, a Board-
regulated institution must maintain capital commensurate with the level 
and nature of all risks to which the Board-regulated institution is exposed. 
The supervisory evaluation of the Board-regulated institution’s capital 
adequacy is based on an individual assessment of numerous factors, 
including the character and condition of the institution’s assets and its 
existing and prospective liabilities and other corporate responsibilities.86 
The supervisory process plays a significant role in the regulation of 
banks’ capital.  Capital adequacy is a key measure in the supervisory 
process; it is listed as the first factor under the supervisory rating system, 
 
 83. Thomas Hoenig, Basel III Capital: A Well-Intended Illusion, Remarks to the International 
Association of Deposit Insurers 2013 Research Conference in Basel, Switzerland, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP. (April 9, 2013), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/spapr0913.html 
[https://perma.cc/8VUZ-VKGZ]. 
 84. The process of risk-weighting is also undermined by the fact that the same assets are 
sometimes assigned different weights.  Leslé & Avramova, supra note 82. 
 85. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, U.S. Bank Resolution Reform: Then and Again, in CROSS 
BORDER INSOLVENCY 411 (Oxford, Rosa Lastra, ed., 2011). 
 86. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10(d) (2015).  See also 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2)(2014) (“Each appropriate 
Federal banking agency shall have the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a 
banking institution as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deems to be 
necessary or appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the banking institution.”). 
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CAMELS.87  Therefore, through the process of bank examination, 
regulators can (and do) determine that a particular bank must hold 
capital in excess of the minimum capital ratios set in applicable rules.  
Such higher levels of capital are imposed, formally, through the 
administrative enforcement mechanisms described in Part III, or 
informally through negotiation. 
Professor Julie Hill conducted a comprehensive empirical study of 
all publicly available formal capital enforcement actions between 1993 
and 2010, a total of 2,350 actions.88  Hill’s study found an increase in 
capital enforcement actions between 2008 and 2010, which 
corresponded with the Financial Crisis.89  According to Hill’s study, 
such enforcement actions most often rely on the leverage ratio as the 
mechanism for imposing higher capital.90  The mean leverage ratio 
imposed in such actions was 8%—double the leverage ratio of 4% set 
under agency rules.91  Hill’s study included one bank that was required 
to meet a 28% leverage ratio (clearly, as Hill notes, an outlier), but also 
twenty-three banks that were required to meet leverage ratios of 
between 12% and 17%.92  In all, Hill’s study found that bank regulators 
had imposed a leverage ratio of between 4.5% and 28% through formal 
enforcement actions during the period studied.93  Note that Hill’s study 
included only banks—not bank holding companies—and that of the 
2,350 enforcement actions studied, only two involved “large” banks.94 
While Hill’s study involved almost exclusively smaller banks, large 
bank holding companies are also subject to significant capital 
supervision.  Large bank holding companies with assets of fifty billion 
dollars or more are required by the Federal Reserve to submit an 
annual capital plan95 and are subject to the Federal Reserve’s annual 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) process.  The 
capital plan is a “written presentation of a bank holding company’s 
capital planning strategies and capital adequacy process . . . .”96  The 
Federal Reserve may object to a bank holding company’s capital plan 
 
 87. CAMELS is an acronym for the examiners assessment of six key areas:  Capital adequacy, 
Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk. 
 88. Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: Am Empirical Study, 87 
IND. L.J. 645 (2012). 
 89. Id. at 672–73. 
 90. 1,691 of the 2,350 actions imposed an increased leverage ratio.  Id. at 679. 
 91. See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (describing the leverage ratio rules for 
banks). 
 92. Hill, supra note 88, at 680. 
 93. Id. at 681.  Hill’s study includes data for enforcement actions that relied on other ratios as 
well, including risk-based capital ratios.  Id. 
 94. Hill’s study relied on the FDIC’s classification of the fifty largest banks to serve as the 
measure of large banks.  Id. at 691. 
 95. Capital Planning, 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2016). 
 96. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(c)(3). 
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and thereby prohibit the bank holding company from making capital 
distributions (i.e., among other things, paying dividends to 
shareholders).97  CCAR is a supervisory process that, among other 
things, assesses the capital plan.  CCAR is an annual assessment that 
complements supervisory stress testing mandated under Dodd-Frank.98  
The Federal Reserve describes CCAR as follows: 
The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) is an annual 
exercise by the Federal Reserve to assess whether the largest bank 
holding companies operating in the United States have sufficient capital 
to continue operations throughout times of economic and financial stress 
and that they have robust, forward-looking capital-planning processes that 
account for their unique risks.99 
The CCAR includes both a qualitative assessment of a bank 
holding company’s capital planning process and, more relevant here, a 
quantitative assessment of the bank holding company’s ability to 
maintain post-stress capital ratios above the applicable minimum ratios 
in effect.100  By testing banks’ regulatory capital under both expected 
and stressed (hypothetical) conditions,101 the CCAR, in effect, results in 
higher minimum capital requirements for large bank holding companies.  
For example, with regard to the leverage ratio, while the minimum 
requirement under the Federal Reserve’s rules is 4%, the CCAR 
 
 97. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(e)(2).  “Capital distribution” means: 
[A] redemption or repurchase of any debt or equity capital instrument, a payment of 
common or preferred stock dividends, a payment that may be temporarily or permanently 
suspended by the issuer on any instrument that is eligible for inclusion in the numerator of 
any minimum regulatory capital ratio and any similar transaction that the Federal Reserve 
determines to be in substance a distribution of capital. 
12 C.F.R. § 225.8(d)(4). 
 98. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1) (2012). 
 99. Stress Tests and Capital Planning, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (June 25, 
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LKD9-FU5V].  For further discussion of the Federal Reserve’s supervisory process 
regarding bank holding company capital, see BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., 
CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND 
RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE (Aug. 2013). 
 100. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS 
AND REVIEW 2015: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 9 (Mar. 2015). 
 101. Stressed conditions are provided both by the Federal Reserve and developed by the bank 
holding company itself. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8(d)(2)(i)(A).  Regarding the development of stressed 
conditions, the Federal Reserve explains: 
[Bank holding company (“BHC”)] stress scenarios should reflect macroeconomic and 
financial conditions that are tailored specifically to stress a BHC’s key vulnerabilities and 
idiosyncratic risks, based on factors such as its particular business model, mix of assets and 
liabilities, geographic footprint, portfolio characteristics, and revenue drivers. . . .  
  BHCs with stronger scenario-design practices clearly and creatively tailored their BHC 
stress scenarios to their unique business-model features, emphasizing important sources of 
risk not captured in the supervisory severely adverse scenario.  Examples of such risks 
observed in practice included a significant counterparty default; a natural disaster or other 
operational-risk event; and a more acute stress on a particular region, industry, and/or asset 
class as compared to the stress applied to general macroeconomic conditions in the 
supervisory adverse and severely adverse scenarios. 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CAPITAL PLANNING AT LARGE BANK HOLDING 
COMPANIES: SUPERVISORY EXPECTATIONS AND RANGE OF CURRENT PRACTICE 17 (Aug., 2013). 
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requires, in effect, higher leverage ratios for all thirty-one individual 
bank holding companies reviewed.  The 2015 CCAR projects a 
minimum leverage ratio of between 4.1% to 11% under severely 
adverse scenarios and between 4.5% to 11.8% for adverse scenarios.102 
E.  Bottom-Up Capital Regulation 
Capital regulation becomes a more complex picture when both 
rulemaking and supervisory practices are considered together.  Using 
the simple leverage ratio as the point of reference, the minimum 
required ratio is not, in fact, the standard to which many banks or bank 
holding companies are held.  The supervisory process imposes higher—
in some cases much higher—capital requirements on banks on a case-
by-case basis.  This happens, as discussed above, either through formal 
enforcement actions or, for large bank holding companies, through the 
capital planning and CCAR process. 
Thus, it becomes clear that bank regulators use their supervisory 
discretionary power to impose capital ratios significantly higher than the 
standards set by regulation.  The result is a system of bottom-up 
regulation with the rules providing the foundation on which the 
supervisory process builds as illustrated below in Figure 1.  The bottom-
up regulatory regime begins with the leverage ratio of between 3 and 
6%, as discussed in Part IV.C,103 and builds up to almost 12% through 
capital planning or the CCAR, and as high as 17% based on the critical 
mass from Hill’s study. 
 
 
 102. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS 
AND REVIEW 2015: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 15–18 (Mar., 2015).  The Federal 
Reserve has completed Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCARs”) every year since 
2011.  Results from year to year during that time are somewhat difficult to compare.  This is because 
the CCAR quantitative assessment focuses on a bank holding company’s ability to maintain required 
minimum ratios during stress periods and the required minimum ratios have changed during this time 
period.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., COMPREHENSIVE CAPITAL ANALYSIS AND 
REVIEW 2014: ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 10, Box 2 (Mar., 2014). 
 103. I have used the simple leverage ratio numbers for purposes of comparison rather than the 
supplementary and enhanced supplementary leverage ratio discussed above.  This is because neither 
Hill’s study nor the CCAR provide data on the supplementary leverage ratios. 
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V.  EVALUATING CAPITAL REGULATION 
Part IV examined the nature of capital regulation with a particular 
focus on the leverage ratio.  That discussion combined both rulemaking 
and supervisory elements of the regulatory process to illustrate the 
bottom-up nature of capital regulation.  This Part considers the 
prominence of capital in the overall context of prudential regulation.  
What are the benefits of capital regulation and are they sufficient to live 
up to its important place in prudential regulation?  In addition, this Part 
considers the limitations of capital regulation. 
Capital has emerged as the cornerstone of modern bank regulation 
because study after study confirms that better capitalized banks perform 
better during crises.104  Studies by the Basel Committee and the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority support the benefits of higher 
capital even when balanced against the costs (although, as discussed 
below, true cost-benefit analysis may prove elusive).105  In addition, the 
leverage ratio has been shown to have countercyclical benefits because 
 
 104. Sebastien Gay & Balthazar D. Bergkamp, Does Basel Save Our Banks?  The Effect of 
Basel I Capital Requirements on Bank Failures (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629268 [https://perma.cc/5PMZ-BAKQ]; 
Andrea Beltratti & René M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why Did Some Banks 
Perform Better?, 105 J. Fin. Econ. 1, 8–10 (2012); Allen Berger & Christa H.S. Bouwman, How Does 
Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises?, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 146 (2013).  An 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) study found that banks with higher and better-quality capital 
were able to continue lending during the Financial Crisis.  Tümer Kapan & Camelia Minoiu, Balance 
Sheet Strength and Bank Lending During the Global Financial Crisis, (Int’l Monetary Fund IMF 
Working Paper No.13/102 May 2012).  
 105. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LONG-TERM 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF STRONGER CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY REQUIREMENTS (Aug., 2010) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf [https://perma.cc/45VF-TTSM]; Ray Barrell et al., Optimal 
Regulation of Bank Capital and Liquidity (Fin. Services Authority Occasional Paper Series No. 38, 
July 2009) http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op38.pdf [https://perma.cc/39ED-A88A]. 
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“it is a tighter constraint for banks in booms and a looser constraint in 
recessions.”106 
Given the importance of capital to protecting banks in crisis, 
positive regulation of bank capital serves all the various normative views 
of bank regulation discussed in Part II.  According to the functional 
view, capital regulation serves the purpose of preserving the functioning 
of banks that provide unique services to the economy.  Under the 
economist’s view of market failure, capital regulation serves as less 
intrusive mechanism for reducing negative externalities than more 
direct activities prohibitions like the Volcker rule.107  While capital 
regulation may create incentives to invest in certain types of assets, it 
does not require banks to do so and thereby defers to management 
discretion.108  Naturally, capital regulation supports the view of banks as 
government instrumentalities that should be operated safely to promote 
the public interest. 
Despite the manifold positive and normative claims supporting 
capital regulation, it suffers from limitations.  First and foremost is the 
reality that the international regulation of capital, which began in the 
1980s, did not prevent the devastating Financial Crisis in 2008.  Using 
this measure, capital regulation is a failure.  And yet, the attacks on the 
effectiveness of capital regulation boil down to a regulatory regime that 
allowed banks to operate with far too little capital.  The standard 
criticism of the leverage ratio is that it does not distinguish between 
types of assets.  Yet if the minimum ratio is set sufficiently high, the 
 
 106. Michael Brei & Leonardo Gambacorta, The Leverage Ratio over the Cycle, (Bank of Int’l 
Settlements Working Papers No. 471 Nov. 2014).  The leverage ratio is also a good predictor of bank 
failure.  Arturo Estrella et al., Capital Ratios as Predictors of Bank Failure, 6 FRNY ECON. POL’Y 
REV. 33 (July 2000). 
 107. Nothing herein is meant to suggest that regulating capital is effective on its own or, in 
particular, that the leverage ratio is effective on its own.  For example, financial instability can 
emanate from short-term debt and capital regulation does not directly address that particular 
problem (but, liquidity ratios do).  See Gary B. Gorton, MISUNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING (Oxford Univ. Press, 2012) (demonstrating that financial 
crises begin with a run on short-term bank debt).  Moreover, as discussed above in Part IV, the 
leverage ratio when standing alone can create perverse risk incentives—the risk based capital ratio is 
intended to counteract those incentives.  Stefan Ingves, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
Chairman, writes: 
The leverage ratio, by placing an absolute cap on borrowings relative to a bank’s capital, is 
an important component of the Basel III framework, and complements the risk-based 
capital adequacy regime.  But neither of these parts of the framework stands alone: it is 
important to look at Basel III as a package of constraints that mutually reinforce prudent 
behaviour. 
Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Keynote Address to the 10th Asia-
Pacific High-Level Meeting on Banking Supervision: Banking on Leverage 5 (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp140226.pdf [ https://perma.cc/C7JA-HSAS]. 
 108. Alan Greenspan writes, “Lawmakers and regulators, given elevated capital buffers, need to 
be far less concerned about the quality of the banks’ loan and securities portfolios since any losses 
would be absorbed by shareholders, not taxpayers.”  Alan Greenspan, Opinion, More Capital is a 
Less Painful Way to Fix the Banks, FIN. TIMES (August 17, 2015 5:24 p.m.), 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4d55622a-44c8-11e5-af2f-4d6e0e5eda22.html#axzz3z8LZto9d 
[https://perma.cc/95TS-892C]. 
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nature of the mix of assets held by the institution will be less important 
to its solvency (in fact, that is the whole point of the leverage ratio).  
The typical criticism of the risk-weighted capital ratio is that it attempts 
to measure the riskiness of assets but does so poorly.  But, again, this 
type of error is much less important if the minimum required is not so 
minimal. 
We are left with a situation in which we know that more capital is 
good but we do not know how much capital is enough.  Quantifying 
adequate capital is fraught with potential error.  With regard to the 
denominator of both the leverage ratio and the risk-weighted capital 
ratio, potential errors are evident in valuing assets, determining their 
risk weights, and corralling off-balance sheet exposures.  With regard to 
the numerator, while Basel III made significant improvements in 
defining the nature of capital, significant issues remain with regard to 
the loss absorbing nature of capital.109  Perhaps most striking is the lack 
of any principled basis for the current minimum capital rules.  The Basel 
Committee never demonstrated support for setting the original risk 
based capital ratio at 8% and yet that number continues to serve as a 
key reference point. 
An obvious solution to the simultaneous importance and error-
prone nature of capital regulation is to simply require more of it.  A 
growing number of authoritative commentators are urging just that.110  
Economists Admati and Hellwig argue for levels in the 20 to 30% 
range.111  In advance of rulemaking to implement Dodd-Frank, an 
eminent group of economists and former policymakers wrote to urge 
the Federal Reserve to adopt a leverage ratio of 20%.112  Researchers at 
the Bank of England and Bank of International Settlements, David 
Miles, Jing Yang, and Gilberto Marcheggiano, suggest doubling the 
 
 109. Professor Arthur Wilmarth has criticized current Federal Reserve proposals regarding total 
loss absorbing capital (which is intended to absorb losses in the event of a bank insolvency) because 
such capital would likely be held by pensions and mutual funds, thus placing the loss of insolvency on 
ordinary investors.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Fed’s TLAC Propose Would Impose the Cost of 




 110. Note that the variation in percentages among commentators is likely not really about 
different levels of capital, but more about which ratio the particular commentator has chosen as the 
basis for their proposal. 
 111. ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 182 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2013). 
 112. Letter from Sheila Bair, Former Chairman of the FDIC, et al., to the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/April/20120403/R-1438/R-
1438_033012_107166_399897884753_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5JNX-UK93].  Specifically, they 
recommend that large bank holding companies “should be required to have ratios of 20% of common 
and preferred equity and subordinated debt to total (non-risk weighted) consolidated assets and 30% 
of total equity and unsecured long-term debt to such assets.”  Id. 
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requirements set by Basel III.  Martin Wolf, chief economics 
commentator for The Financial Times, recommends a leverage ratio of 
at least 10% and “ideally more.”113  Even former free-market-apologist, 
Alan Greenspan favours capital at “20 or even 30 percent of assets.”114 
The objections to higher capital requirements focus on the resulting 
increased cost to banks which in turn would increase the cost of credit.  
This claim is controversial.115  In addition, studies which attempt to 
measure costs and benefits are far from perfect.  Professor John Coates 
challenges the conclusions of studies on the net benefits of capital and 
other financial regulations because they all suffer from, among other 
limitations, insufficient data, casual inference challenges, and reliance 
on imperfect models.116  Of course, the same objections apply to claims 
that capital regulation generates a net cost.  And yet, the key benefit of 
capital remains uncontroversial: better capitalized banks are more 
resilient in an economic downturn. 
VI.  TOP-DOWN CAPITAL REGULATION 
Current capital regulation relies on a supervisory process of 
estimating adequate capital for individual firms supported by bare 
minimum, apply-to-all, rules that hang perilously close to the ground.  
This places a heavy burden on the effectiveness of CCAR and agency 
enforcement to ensure the safety of our financial system.  Therefore, the 
calls for significantly higher capital requirements discussed in Part V 
come as no surprise.  This Part makes no attempt to settle any debate 
about whether, for example, the leverage ratio should be set at 20 or 
30%.  This Part does, however, support significantly higher minimum 
capital requirements based on observations regarding current regulatory 
practice. 
As demonstrated in Part IV, the reality of capital regulation must 
take into account both minimum ratios set by rule and the ratios 
 
 113. Martin Wolf, ‘Too Big to Fail’ is Too Big to Ignore, FIN. TIMES, April 15, 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f755c450-c3c2-11e3-870b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3z8LZto9d 
[https://perma.cc/UL6X-Y86R].  He goes on to say that at very least, “equity should be raised until all 
measures of the subsidy are zero.”  Id.  In other words, suggesting that banks should be forced to 
build their equity until they no longer benefit from any funding advantage based on government 
subsidies. 
 114. Greenspan, supra note 108. 
 115. Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Would Stricter Capital Requirements Raise the Cost of 
Capital?  Bank Capital Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly (Mar. 15, 2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233906 [https://perma.cc/V5ZT-B3DA]; 
Douglas Elliott et al., Assessing the Cost of Financial Regulation (Int’l Monetary Fund Working 
Paper No. 12/233 Sept. 2012). 
 116. John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation:  Case Studies and 
Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 997 (2015); but see Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, The Case for 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations, REG. Mag. 30 (Winter 2013-2014) (arguing in favor 
of cost-benefit analysis and using capital regulation as a running example). 
SCHOONER CORRECT (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2016  12:19 PM 
352 Washburn Law Journal [Vol. 55 
 
imposed through the exercise of supervisory discretion.  Taken together, 
the current regime is a bottom-up approach to capital regulation in 
which rule-based minimum ratios are applied to all institutions and 
higher requirements are imposed on a firm-by-firm basis through 
various supervisory mechanisms.  This bottom-up approach speaks 
volumes regarding minimum capital rules.  Minimum ratios are truly, 
barely minimum.  They do not serve as a benchmark for adequate 
capital but, instead, perhaps serve only at the rock bottom starting point 
for the supervisory process by which capital levels are ultimately set.117 
So-called “dynamic capital supervision”118 like CCAR responds to 
the deficiencies of minimum ratios which have been shown time and 
again to serve as lagging indicators of financial trouble within a financial 
institution.119  Yet, reliance on the supervisory process to set 
appropriate capital level when the minimum rules are inadequate places 
all of the risk of error at the feet of the regulatory agencies—thus, 
ultimately, the public.  This is because if the CCAR process does not 
reliably serve to prepare institutions for the economic bust, government 
subsidies (either explicit or implicit) will be tapped to protect such 
institutions, and the public will suffer from greater damage to the 
economy.120 
In evaluating the current bottom-up approach to capital regulation, 
it is useful to consider the types of error that regulators might make in 
either setting minimum ratios or exercising their supervisory discretion.  
Since regulators are attempting to identify weak banks through capital 
regulation, a false positive (type one error) would occur if the bank 
regulator thought a bank was undercapitalized when it was not.  On the 
other hand, a false negative (type two error) would occur if the bank 
regulator thought a bank was adequately capitalized and it actually was 
not.  The risks associated with the false negative should be, and are, the 
primary concern of a bank regulator, and the current system seems ill 
suited to avoid that type of error.  Moreover, the false positive should 
not be ignored to the extent that there remains controversy over the 
costs of capital. 
 
 117. Hill asserts that, “[s]tatements from bank regulators show that they believe the minimum 
capital ratios established by regulation are insufficient.”  Hill supra note 88, at 700.  Of course, Hill’s 
study was conducted prior to the implementation of new, Basel III and Dodd-Frank capital ratios. 
 118. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Developing Tools for Dynamic Capital Supervision, BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS. (April 10, 2012), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120410a.htm [https://perma.cc/ADV8-
V8N4]. 
 119. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
 120. And, while it is true that this is largely a concern with regard to very large institutions and 
their persistent status as too big to fail, we must not forget that small banks are also important to our 
economy and have access to government subsidies.  Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Regulating Angels, 50 
GA. L. REV. 143 (2015). 
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The potential risks of both types of error could be more sensibly 
addressed by flipping the current practice from a bottom-up to a top-
down system of capital regulation.  In a top-down system, capital ratios 
applying to all banks would be set high—high enough so that the risk of 
a false negative is very small.121  The risk of a false positive would be 
addressed through a supervisory process, in which banks could be 
permitted, on a firm-by-firm basis, to operate below capital levels set by 
rule.  The move from the bottom-up to the top-down regime is 
illustrated below in Figure 2. 
Flipping the supervisory and rulemaking process requires further 
exploration.  Consider a hypothetical, very large bank called MegaBank.  
If the leverage ratio is set at 20%, then MegaBank would be required to 
comply with that ratio.  Under the top-down scenario, the CCAR 
process could be used to establish that MegaBank needs only, say, 11% 
to survive an adverse or severely adverse scenario.  Such a simple flip 
would leave us with virtually the same system as the current one in 
which the risk of error in allowing that bank to operate with an 11% 
ratio would be borne by the public (via regulator error).  The problem 
 
 121. See supra Part V (discussing proposals for high capital ratios). 
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ultimately is that the system does not place the risk of loss on those who 
are in the best position to avoid the risk—bank management.  As 
discussed in Part IV, bank managers are ultimately responsible for 
capital adequacy and appropriately so given their superior knowledge of 
their firms’ operations and risk management.  Thus, the top-down 
system would access that superior knowledge and provide incentives to 
avoid error by relying on bank managers to determine appropriate 
capital adequacy levels.  In this way, if MegaBank wished to operate at a 
leverage ratio lower than required under applicable rules (which now 
serve as a safe harbor), MegaBank’s management could apply 
regulators for exemption from the rules.  Such an application would 
require management to certify that MegaBank could operate safely at 
lower levels of capital.  To create appropriate incentives for a 
meaningful application (as opposed to a pro forma statement that lower 
capital is adequate), such application would serve as the basis for 
personal liability (including appropriate fines and other penalties) 
against managers if their assertions regarding capital adequacy proved 
wrong (a false negative). 
The exact parameters of the personal liability of management are 
beyond the scope of this Article and could be the subject of further 
study.  The basis for such individual liability exists in the current 
administrative enforcement regime.122  If, for example, executive 
management of Megabank applied to the Federal Reserve for the 
authority to operate below safe harbor rules, they would be required to 
assert that the bank’s solvency would not be at risk.  If assertions in that 
application proved false, the Federal Reserve’s administrative 
enforcement powers would be triggered so that, for example, the 
Federal Reserve could impose a cease and desist order on the bank and 
its managers, including an order of restitution, reimbursement, or 
indemnification.123 
And yet, existing administrative enforcement authority often 
requires a showing of personal gain or culpability which would 
undermine the usefulness of such recourse.124  Therefore, the top-down 
capital regulation proposal is most complemented by those who argue in 
favor of greater personal liability for bank managers.125  Often such 
 
 122. See supra Part III (discussing administrative enforcement powers). 
 123. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) (2012) provides for cease and desist authority “in connection with any 
action on any application, notice, or other request . . . by the institution-affiliated party . . . .” 
 124. For example, agency cease and desist authority included the ability to seek restitution 
against bank managers but only of such party was “unjustly enriched in connection with such 
violation or practice,”  Id. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i),or if “the violation or practice involved reckless 
disregard for the law . . . .”  Id. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i)–(ii).  
 125. Schwarcz, Keynote Reflections, supra note 16 (arguing that [systematically important 
financial institution] managers should have a “public governance duty”); Lyman Johnson, Corporate 
Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. L.J. 865 (2005); Donald Langevoort, On Leaving 
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proposals harken back to the days when Wall Street banks were formed 
as partnerships and the partners enjoyed none of the liability 
protections afforded corporate shareholders and, ultimately, 
managers.126  Professors Claire Hill and Richard Painter offer a 
thoughtful exploration of a system of strict liability for certain bank 
managers in the event of insolvency.127  High capital ratios that allow for 
managers to apply for authority to operate at lower levels of capital 
would work well within such a system of personal accountability. 
The top-down system benefits bank management since it depends 
on the determination of a leverage (or other) ratio set high enough that 
it acts as a safe harbor.  As such, banks and bank managers would not 
be subject to liability if the bank met the ratio.  Under the current 
system, banks cannot be sure that meeting minimum rules is adequate 
and, as discussed, very often it is not.  Under the top-down system, the 
regulatory ratios would have more meaning in that management could 
rely on achieving compliance at that level.  On the other hand, managers 
with the confidence that their bank can be safely operated at lower 
levels of capital would be given the flexibility to do so.  Appropriately, 
the risk of error in such situations would be borne by management, 
through personal liability, which would assure that such an important 
determination was made with deliberation and appropriate confidence. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Better capitalized banks are more sustainable during financial 
crises.  Therefore, the regulation of bank capital is an essential element 
in efforts to reduce the threat of systemic crisis.  The current system, 
however, does not properly account for the risk of error in determining 
appropriate levels of capital.  The proposed system of top-down capital 
regulation is a superior approach which balances the benefits of 
mandating precautionary levels of capital against the informed wisdom 
of bank management in determining the viability of safe operations at 
lower levels of capital. In this way, capital regulation is better positioned 
to deliver on its promise of safer banks and a more resilient financial 
system. 
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